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III.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The appellant's Statement of Jurisdiction referring to
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure is inadequate. The
appellate rules have no effect on jurisdiction.

U.R.A.P. 1(d);

c.f. , Gregory v. Fourthwest Investment, Ltd.. 735 P.2d 33 (Utah
1987)

(referring to §78-2-2 without citing the subdivision is

inappropriate). The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2(a)-3(k).
IV.
IS8UE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review are (1) whether the trial
court exceeded its broad discretion when it granted an additur of
special damages based on uncontested evidence of future medical
expenses; and (2) whether the costs awarded were appropriate.
The standard of review set forth in appellant's Brief on
the first issue is incorrect.

The standard of review is abuse of

discretion. In reviewing the Judge's ultimate decision granting an
additur, the reviewing court will reverse only if there is no
reasonable basis for the decision.
Exchange.
Casualty

817 P.2d
&

Surety

(remittitur).

789
Co.,

Crookston v. Fire Insurance

(Utah 1991).
848

P.2d

See Andreason v. Aetna

171, 174

(Utah

App.

1993)

Similarly, the lower court's cost award (issue (2))

1

is also reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard (Appellant's
brief p. 2).
V.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The statement of the case set forth in appellant's Brief
is also inadequate because it fails to set forth the facts relevant
to the issues presented for review.

Herold's statement also sets

forth numerous factors that are not relevant to the issues
presented for review.

For example:

Paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10 are irrelevant. At trial,
the lower court found that Herold made an improper left turn and
directed a verdict on the issue of negligence.
The Court:
It is my position that there is
no question about the defendant's negligence
*

*

*

. . . I will take the special verdict form
now, and place an X on 1 in the box where it
says "Yes" and I will instruct the jury that .
. . [T]he first question has been answered for
them, and that is at the time and place of the
incident
in
question,
and
under
the
circumstances, as shown by the evidence, the
defendant Brian Herold was negligent.
(R. 925, la*. 16-17; 926, Ins. 4-11).
The verdict was marked and the jury was so instructed
that Herold was negligent. Moreover, Herold did not object to the
directed

verdict

below

and

did

not

appeal

negligence, only the lower court's additur.

2

the

finding

of

Mr. Dunn:

. . . We don't deny that there
is negligence on Brian's part.

The Court:

You
don't
negligence?

Mr. Dunn:

We do not.

deny

there

is

(R. 902, Ins. 13-17).
The jury also found that Dalton was 20% negligent (R.
293) and neither party appealed the finding.

In summary, the

issues of negligence and comparative negligence in this case are
not issues on appeal.

Thus, paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, and 10 of

Herold's statement of the case are irrelevant.
Similarly, paragraphs 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30 of
Herold's statement of the case are largely irrelevant because the
testimony of the expert witnesses was that proper oral hygiene had
no effect on the need for surgery to correct Dalton's TMJ problem.
(R. 837 - 839).

When questioned by Herold's counsel, the oral

surgeon testified:
Mr. Dunn:

Q:

If someone has poor dental hygiene
or hygiene with their mouth, does
that have any bearing on aggravating
or making TMJ worse?

Dr. MfJc#aell

A:

The
poor
dental
hygiene
itself, I
don • t think would
affect that.

(R. 839, Ins. 20-24).
The appellant's brief also fails to set forth the facts
in the

light required

on appeal.

On appeal, the facts and

inferences therefrom are reviewed in the light most favorable to
the lower court's ultimate decision. Crookston. supra. Viewed in
that light, the facts relevant to the issue presented for review
are as follows.
On October 15, 1990, Dalton was riding his motorcycle
northbound on 900 West near the North Temple intersection. Herold
was facing southbound attempting to turn left to go eastbound.
Herold turned left in front of Dalton's motorcycle and caused a
collision.

(R. 611-621).

At trial, Herold conceded that he was

negligent and the court directed a verdict on the issue of Herold's
negligence.

(R. 902, 925-926).

As a result of the collision, Dalton sustained numerous
fractures to his face1. Bones near his right eye were broken. His
cheek bones were also broken. There was a bone chip in his sinus.
1

The medical terms for Dalton's injuries follow. Dalton
sustained: multiple fractures involving the right maxillary antral
area; blowout fracture involving the floor of the right orbit;
tripod
fracture;
nasal
fracture;
tooth
fracture;
displaced/dislocated meniscus, temporomandibular joint dysfunction
on the right side of the jaw (TMJ) ; nerve damage with facial
numbness, eye numbness and lip numbness; and forehead lacerations.
He also sustained the following damages to his arm, shoulder, hands
and knee:
brachial plexus stretch injury with abnormal EMG;
hypersensitivity of the dorsal cutaneous branch of the right ulnar
nerve; distal and proximal sensory loss in the radial arm;
decreased inward rotation of the right shoulder; headaches, neck
pain, shoulder pain, arm pain, jaw pain, and popping and grinding;
diplopia-blurry vision when laying on the right side; depressed or
flattened right maxilla; left knee contusions and abrasions and
aggravation of prior knee injury; moderate to severe pain in the
physical areas of the anatomy injured; and permanent impairment,
nerve damage, and sensory loss.
4

His upper jaw fractured which caused the area between his "arch. .
. and teeth- • ." to be

lf

literally free floating" (R. 652-657, 750-

755, 768-782, 832-836).

Dalton also sustained cuts and bruises,

facial nerve damage, nerve damage to his hand and knee damage.

He

also experienced double vision (R. 653-658, 661-662, 750 -757, 764765, 874-875, 881, 886). His knee is still loose (R. 692) and he
cannot participate in sports

(R. 663).

Even Herold's medical

expert assigned Dalton a 4% impairment rating (R. 897, Tr. ex. 10).
Four doctors testified at the trial.

Dr. James Morgan

was an orthopedic surgeon who examined Dalton a month and a half
after the accident
fractures

(R.

(R. 749-750).

753-759).

He diagnosed Dalton's facial

However,

since

his

specialty

was

orthopedic surgery, he did not treat facial and jaw fractures and
was not in the position to determine whether future surgeries were
required.
Mr. Waddoups:

Q:

Since you don't treat TMJ, it wouldn't be
your position or opinion to determine
whether somebody needs surgery on the
jaw; is that correct?

A:

Correct.

Q:

And since you don't treat the area of
what area that had the blow out
fractures, you wouldn't be the doctor to
recommend whether the person has surgery
or not, would you?

A:

No, I would not.

Q:

And again, you're an orthopedic doctor?

5

A:

Correct.

(R. 762, Ins. 24-25; 763, Ins. 1-7).

Dr. Richard Hodnett, a plastic surgeon specializing in
facial reconstructive surgery, examined Dalton twice; once two
months after the accident and again before trial (R. 765, 767). He
testified that Dalton will require two surgeries. One surgery, is
needed to remove a bone chip near a nerve that controls sensation
in the lip.

Hodnett estimated the cost for this surgery to be

$2,500 - $3,500 for the physician and $5,000 - $8,000 for the
hospital (R. 771-772). He also testified that Dalton will require
surgery on his upper jaw.
783-784).

He estimated this cost at $15,000 (R.

Hodnett did not examine Dalton's neck, shoulder and

knees and did not express an opinion as to what should be done for
those injuries (R. 785).
Dr. Leo Vaughn Mikesell also examined Dalton. Mikesell
specializes in oral and maxillofacial surgery.

He treats TMJ

patients (R. 824) . He testified that Dalton will require surgery
(an arthroplasty) and that the surgery will cost $2,500 - $3,500
for the physician and $5,000 - $8,000 for the hospital (R. 836-837,
840-841). Ha also testified that Dalton will require a bridge with
an incurradl cost of approximately $1,200 - $1,300.
Herold's medical expert was Dr. E. Warren Stadler, Jr.,
a specialist in physical rehabilitation (R. 864). On the basis of
feeling Dalton1s face with his hands, he testified that Dalton
6

would not require further surgery

(R. 573, Ins. 6-10).

The

rationale for his decision was that Dalton suffered facial nerve
damages that would not be corrected by surgery

(R. 874-876).

Stadler admitted that he does not treat tripod or blow out facial
fractures and he does not do surgery (R. 882, Ins. 6-17).
treats patients, after the fractures have been repaired.

He

He does

not repair the fractures (R. 897).
Dalton's past medical expenses were established by Trial
Exhibit 3. Herold stipulated to the admission of the exhibit (R.
366, 402, 805, 806). These past medical expenses were not paid by
Dalton because he could not afford to pay them and Herold1s
insurance company did not advance the costs for the medical care.
For the same reason, Dalton did not obtain the medical care
recommended by his physicians (R. 795-797).
Despite Dalton1s numerous fractures and need for further
medical care, the jury only awarded him $3,000 for special damages
and $5,000 for general damages. The judgment was discounted by 20%
because the jury also found Dalton 20% at fault (R. 292-293).
Dalton timely filed a motion for an additur or in the
alternative a new trial.

The trial judge concluded that "the

jury's award, was clearly inadequate in light of the evidence
presented at trial" and "outside the limits of any reasonable
appraisal of damages as shown by the evidence" and granted an
additur to $19,902.24 (R. 433-439).
7

At the conclusion of the

memorandum decision, the trial court judge notified Herold that he
could

accept the ruling or request a new trial.

neither2.

Thereafter, the court entered a judgment.

Herold did
The judgment

reduced the special damage award by 20% because the jury found
Dalton 20% at fault (R. 456). Herold appealed the additur.

VI.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW OF AN ORDER
GRANTING ADDITUR IS ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
On appeal of an additur, the reviewing court does not, as
urged

by

Herold,

directly

view

the

verdict

and

ignore

the

intermediate action of a trial court. Instead, the reviewing court
focuses on the ultimate decision of a trial court and reverses only
if the lower court abuses its discretion.

That is, it reverses

only if there is no reasonable basis for the decision.

E.g.

Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799

(Utah

1991) .

2

Having appealed the judgment granted and additur, Herold
cannot chose a new trial on the issue of damages if he loses his
appeal on the additur issue. Jacobsen v. Manfredi. 679 P.2d 251,
255 n.4 (Nev. 1984).
8

POINT II
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN GRANTING AN ADDITUR.
The lower court decision to grant a modest additur was
well within the discretion granted a trial court.

As set forth in

Point II in the argument section of this brief, the decision has a
reasonable basis.

Both the evidence of special damages and the

serious injuries incurred by Dalton justify the award.

Moreover,

in granting the additur, the lower court applied correct standard
to reach its decision.

POINT III
THE COSTS AWARDED WERE
AUTHORIZED AND APPROPRIATE.
Because Herold1 s offer of judgment is less favorable than
the judgment obtained by Dalton, lower court M a matter of course"
correctly awarded Dalton his costs pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The lower court's cost decision is

viewed under an abuse of discretion.

Herold has totally failed to

show any abuse of discretion by the trial court.

9

VII.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW OF AN ORDER
GRANTING ADDITUR IS ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
THE STANDARD IS NOT WHETHER THE JURY'S
INITIAL VERDICT WAS BEYOND RATIONAL
JUSTIFICATION OR A PRODUCT OF
PASSION OR PREJUDICE,
A.

The Appellant's Brief,
Relying

principally

on

Bennion

v,

LeGrand

Johnson

Construction Co,,3; Bundy v. Century Equipment Co,,4; and Battv v,
Mitchell.5, three cases that have nothing to do with reviewing a
trial

court's

order

granting

an

additur,

Herold

repeatedly

misstates and/or urges this Court to apply an incorrect standard of
review to the district court's Order granting a modest additur.
For example, on pages 2 and 3 of his Brief, Herold says:
A reviewing court will defer to the jury's
damage award unless the award indicates that
the jury disregarded competent evidence or
that the award is so excessive or inadequate
beyond rational justification as to indicate
the effect of improper factors in the
determination or the award was reached under a
misunderstanding. Bennion v, LeGrand Johnson
Construction Co,
(Appellant1» Brief, pp. 1-2.)
3

701 P.2d 1078, 1084 (Utah 1985)

4

692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1981)

5

575 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1971)
10

Similarly, Herold subsequently argues that the lower
court was not "empowered to entertain a motion for an additur"
because the courts:
. . . upset a jury verdict only upon a showing
that the evidence so clearly preponderates in
favor of the appellant that reasonable people
would not differ on the outcome of the case
....
Bundy v. Century Equipment Co.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 13.)
On page 34 of his Brief, Herold concludes that the
additur must be reversed because:
Clearly sufficient competent evidence existed
to enable the jury to arrive at its verdict
for damages and accordingly the jury's verdict
should stand. Battv v. Mitchell
However, on appeal of an additur, the reviewing court
does not, as urged by Herold, directly review the verdict and
ignore the intermediate action by the trial court.
v. Aetna

Casualty

Co.. 848 P.2d

171, 174

See Andreason

(Utah App.

1993).

Instead, the reviewing court focuses on the ultimate decision of
the trial court and determines whether the lower court abused its
discretion.

Id.

The Court of Appeals in Andreason relied on the seminal
case of Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah
1991).

In Crookston. the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged the

confusion on the standard of review to be applied to motions

11

challenging the amount of a jury verdict and vowed to clear the
confusion up:
First, we will address the standard for review
to be applied by a trial court considering a
motion that attacks the amount of a jury's
damage award.
Second, we will discuss the
standard of review to be followed by an
appellate court reviewing the trial court's
decision on a challenge to a jury's damage
award. (Emphasis added.)
Crookston, supra at 802.
After acknowledging that any determination of whether the
jury exceeded its proper bounds is best made in the first instance
by the trial court, the Crookston court announced the following
standard of review:
In reviewing the Judge's ultimate decision
. . . we will reverse only if there is no
reasonable basis for the decision.
Id. at
809.
The Court went on to explain that the standards of review
cited in Bennion, Bundy and Batty, the cases relied upon by Herold,
are misleading.
In light of the foregoing, some statements
about standards of review in prior cases can
be read as misleading, though not actually
incorrect. For example, in Bennion v. LeGrand
Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah
1985), we stated that a "reviewing court will
defer to a jury's damage award unless the
award indicates that the jury disregarded
competent evidence." Id. at 1084 (citations
omitted); see also Batty v. Mitchell, 575 P.2d
1040, 1043 (Utah 1978). See generally, Bundv
v. Century Eguioment Co. . 692 P.2d 754 (Utah
1984); First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J.
12

Feedvards, Inc.. 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982).
This statement of the standard, though perhaps
not an inaccurate characterization of the test
to be applied by a trial court faced with a
new trial motion under rule 59, is inaccurate
if it purports to state the standard of review
by which an appellate court determines the
propriety of a trial court's decision to grant
or deny a new trial. The statement can be
read to mean that this court reviews the
jury's action directly, when in reality we
review the trial court's action for an abuse
of discretion.
It is this type of loosely
worded
standard
which
has, over time,
effectively confused the appellate court's
proper role in assessing the merits of a rule
59 motion attacking a jury verdict with that
of the trial judge. E.g., Bennion, 701 P.2d
at 1083-84; Bundy, 692 P.2d at 758-59; First
Security. 653 P.2d at 599; Battv. 575 P.2d at
1043.
In summary, whether the trial court's additur will be
upheld

or

reversed

does

not

depend

upon

whether

the

jury

disregarded competent evidence or any other standard advocated in
Herold's brief. Instead, the court's ultimate decision in granting
or denying an additur will be reversed only if the lower court
abused its discretion.6 Crookston at 709, 805; Andreason. supra at
6

Other surrounding jurisdictions have also held that the
standard of review of an order granting an additur is abuse of
discretion* E.g.. B<?n4 v» Cartwright y. Little l»3acpj?r IhCw 536
P.2d 697, 704 (Ariz. 1975) (the question of an additur is left to
the largest possible discretion of the trial court, and its
decision will not be reversed on appeal, except in a clear case of
abuse of discretion); Carlson v, gflW Industry gervjggffi IflPw 744
P.2d 1383, 1390 (Wyo. 1987) (we will not set aside the granting of
an additur unless an abuse of discretion is shown); Jacobsen v.
Manfedi, 679 P.2d 251, 255 (Nev. 1984) (reviewing court defers to
the trial court's point of view); Jehl v. Southern Pacific Co., 427
P.2d 968, 995 (Cal. 1967) (if trial court decides to order an
13

174. As hereinafter set forth in Point II, the lower court's Order
granting a modest additur has a reasonable basis. Thus, the court
acted well within the discretion granted to the trial court.

POINT II
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN GRANTING AN ADDITUR.
A.

The Trial Court Applied the Correct Standards in Granting The
Modest Additur.
The first Utah case to consider the standards for

granting an additur was Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 372 P.2d
826 (Utah 1958).

The Bodon Court explained that additurs have

nothing to do with jury verdicts resulting

from passion or

prejudice.
We are not here concerned with any question
to whether the disparity in the verdict is
gross as to indicate that the whole verdict
so filled with passion and prejudice
that
should be entirely set aside.7 Id. at 45.

as
so
is
it

Instead, the Court said that when a verdict is outside the limits
of any reasonable appraisal of damages as shown by the evidence, it
additur, it should exercise its complete and independent judgment) .
7

The Bodon analysis has been accepted in neighboring
jurisdictions. In Creamer v. Troiano, 494 P.2d 738, 739 (Ariz.
App. 1972), the Court explained
that the trial court must make two
determinations when a juryfs verdict is challenged. If the jury
verdict is so inadequate as to be the result of passion or
prejudice, the court must order a new trial. However, if the trial
court's determination is that the award is merely insufficient, the
court should award an additur.
14

is the prerogative and duty of the trial court to order any
necessary modification."

Bodon. supra at 47.

Subsequently, in Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P. 2d 685, 686
(Utah 1988) , the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed that the trial court
may grant an additur if the evidence compels "a finding that
reasonable persons would reach a different measure of damages." In
other words, if a disciplined review of the evidence shows that
reasonable minds would not differ on a minimum amount of damages,
and the jury verdict is less, then the trial court should correct
the error. See John Call Engineering v. Manti City, 795 P.2d 678,
683 (Utah App. 1990).
In this case, the trial court surveyed the evidence "in
the light most favorable to the jury's findings" (R. 433). It then
applied the stance as enunciated in Bodon. supra and Dupuis. supra
to correctly conclude, "the jury's award is clearly inadequate in
light of the evidence presented at trial."

Id. at 433-436.

In

summary, the lower court applied correct standards in granting the
modest additur.

Moreover, as set forth below, any disciplined

review of the evidence shows that the jury verdict was clearly
against the weight of the evidence and outside the limits of any
reasonable appraisal of damages.
B.

The Lower Court's Disciplined Review of the Evidence Shows
That the Verdict Was Clearly Outside the Limits of Anv
Reasonable Appraisal of Damages.
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1.

Proceedings in the Lower Court
The

lower

court, after

a review

of the evidence,

concluded that the $3,000.00 special damages verdict did not bear
a reasonable relationship to the trial evidence.

The Court noted

that the parties stipulated to past medical bills of $2,903.24.
The Court then surveyed the expert medical testimony and correctly
concluded that the amount of $20,007.00 for future medical expenses
was uncontroverted at trial (R. 436) .

As set forth below, the

Court's disciplined review of the evidence was correct.

In

addition, although the Court did not base its additur on the
serious injuries sustained by Dalton, the injuries also support the
additur awarded by the Court.
2.

Thq Special Qamages Svjcfengg, That 19, Svi<3?nC3 <?t Pagt
and Future Medical Expenses, Was Uncontroverted.
The evidence establishing past medical expenses was Trial

Exhibit 3. Herold did not object to its admission. Trial Exhibit
3 establishes past medical expenses of $2,903.74.
Only three witnesses, other than Dalton, testified on the
subject of Dalton1s future medical expenses. Dr. Richard Hodnett,
a plastic WKyton, testified:
Bis [Dalton1s] CT scan showed that there was a
chip of bone from the bottom of the eye socket
down the. . . sinus.
And if he had the
numbness when I saw him, and looking at the CT
scan, . . . he may still have need of what is
called plate and screw fixation, or another
open procedure to possibly remove a bone chip
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from around his nerve which was the nerve that
controls the sensation to his lip.
(R. 770, Ins. 24-25; 771, Ins. 1-8).
*

Q:
A:

*

*

(By Ms. Thomas) Approximately how much
would that kind of surgery cost,
physician fees and hospital fees?
The doctor's fees would probably be in
the range of $2,500 - $3,500. . . and. .
. probably in the range of $5,000 $8,000 in hospital fees, I would assume.

(R. 771, Ins. 23-25; 772, Ins. 1, 7, 9-10).
Dr. Hodnett also testified that Dalton would require an
osteotomy8 and that the cost would be $15,000 (R. 783-784).
Similarly, Dr. Leo Vaughn Mikesell, a specialist in
maxillofacial surgery, also testified:
Mr. Waddoups: Q:

Dr. Mikesell, after examining Mr.
Dalton and reviewing the medical
records
and
the
scans,
the
diagnostic tests, have you formed an
opinion as to whether Mr. Dalton
needs surgery to correct his TMJ?

The Witness:

I have yes.
Q:

What is your opinion?

A:

I think that at some time, he will have
to have surgery to correct that, yes.

(R. 840, Ins. 7-10, 15-18).

8

An osteotomy is the rebreaking of the jaw bones and putting
them in the proper place (R. 784, Ins. 1-7).
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The surgery recommended in Mikesell's treatment plan is
an arthroplasty.

Mikesell estimated the cost at $2,500 - $3,000

and $8,000 for the hospital fees (R. 836-837).

He also testified

that Dalton needs a bridge that could cost somewhere between $1,200
- $1,300 (R. 859, 860, In. 3 ) .
Herold

called Dr. Stadler, a specialist

in physical

rehabilitation, as a witness. However, Stadler did not controvert
the cost of the special damages.

That issue was undisputed.

Moreover, while it is true that Stadler opined that Dalton would
not

benefit

from

future

surgery,

the

trial

court

properly

discounted his opinion because (1) Stadler was not a surgeon, so
his testimony warranted very little weight; and (2) his opinion was
based

only upon

feeling Dalton's face with his hands9, again

justifying very little weight; and crediting the testimony of the
surgeons who were qualified on the subject of the need for surgery.
In doing so, the trial court acted well within its discretion.

As

set forth in Point I of this Brief, the trial court, in granting an
additur, does not determine whether there is any evidence at all
supporting the verdict but whether the verdict is within or outside
the limit* ©f a reasonable appraisal of damages.

Bodon. supra;

C.f. King v. Union Pac. R. Co.. 212 P. 2d 692 (Utah 1949) (where
there is a substantial conflict of evidence on a material issue,

9

Moreover, the only injury Stadler was concerned with was the
facial nerve damages (R. 874, 876).
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the Supreme Court will defer to the discretion exercised by the
trial court in granting

a new trial) ; see, Carlson v. BMW

Industries. Inc., 744 P.2d 1380, 1338, 1340 (Wyo. 1987) (the trial
court's grant or denial of an additur will not be set aside on
appeal, unless the court acted arbitrarily or capriciously);
Creamer v. Troiano. 494 P. 2d 738, 740 (Ariz. App. 1972) (we do not
believe that here, where there is a conflict in the evidence as to
damages, that the trial court should be reversed when it determines
that the additur was required); Jacobsen v. Manfredi, 679 P.2d 251
(Nev. 1984) (reviewing court must accord deference to the point of
view of the trial judge, since he had the opportunity to weigh the
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses).
C.

The Injuries Sustained By Dalton Also Justify the Additur.
As set forth in Point I, the trial court's decision to

grant an additur will not be reversed unless there is no reasonable
basis for that decision. The reasonable basis need not be the one
used by the trial court. In this case, not only does the evidence
of special damages justify the additur, so does the uncontested
evidence of the injuries and general damages incurred by Dalton.
To summariM*, Dalton sustained numerous facial fractures, a damaged
knee, and nerve damage to his face, shoulder, arm and hand.
the jury only awarded $5,000.00 for these damages.

The injuries

sustained by Dalton justify the lower court's additur.
Jacobsen, supra at 253.
19

Yet,

See

D.

The Doctrine of Unavoidable Consequences or Mitigation of
Damages Did Not Justify Reversing the Additur,
The injured have a duty to reasonably mitigate damages.

Thompson v. Jacobsen, 23 Utah 2d 359, 463 P.2d 801 (1970).

The

doctrine of mitigation of damages, also referred to as the doctrine
of unavoidable consequences, generally operates to prevent one
against whom a wrong has been committed from recovering any item of
damage arising from the wrongful conduct which could have been
avoided by reasonable means.

Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of

Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983).
Herold devotes eight pages of his Brief to the notion
that the additur should be reversed because "the evidence supports
the jury's finding that Dalton failed to mitigate his damages"
(Appellant's Brief, p. 13). However, an examination of the record
and the relevant legal principles show that Herold's argument lacks
both factual and legal support. For example, the jury did not make
any finding one way or the other that Dalton failed to mitigate his
damages.

The special verdict did not ask or allow them to make

such a finding•
Tftfcre are three additional reasons why the Doctrine of
Unavoidable Consequences cannot be used to reverse the additur.
First, the injured is not required to incur a substantial expense
to mitigate damages.

The law only requires that the injured be

willing to expend a trifling expense.

20

22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages,

Section 501 at 585 (1988).

C.f,, Anesthesiologist Associates v.

St. Benedict's Hospital. 852 P.2d 1030, 1040 (Utah 1993) (physician
not required to establish a new practice to mitigate his damages).
In this case, Dalton incurred $2,903.00 in unpaid past medical
expenses (R. 715, 716, 417, 418). There is nothing in the record
showing that he could pay any medical expense. Before the doctrine
of mitigation of damages may be applied, Herold is required to
prove that Dalton had the ability to pay the expenses of mitigating
the damages.

Shellhammer v. Caruthers, 99 S.W.2d 1054 (Tex. Civ.

App. (1936)).
Second, Dalton is not required to take actions which
Herold himself refused to take.

In other words, Dalton could not

be required to expend money on medical care —
not have —
same

money which he did

if Herold, as in this case, could have accomplished the

result

by paying

Dalton's medical

expenses.

See also.

Alexander v. Brown. 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982) (purchaser need
not incur expense of paving the road since the vendor had the same
opportunity to decrease the damages).

In this case, Herold is well

aware, as is his insurance company, that Dalton could not continue
the medical care recommended by the physicians because he could not
afford the medical care,

Herold and his insurance company refused

to advance monies necessary to cover any medical costs.
The final reason that mitigation of damages could not be
used to reverse the additur is that the lower court considered the
21

issue below. Herold strongly urged the district court not to grant
an additur because Herold said that Dalton did not mitigate his
damages (R. 398-399) . The court surveyed the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict and granted the small additur. Once
the court grants the additur, Herold must do more than show that
there was some evidence that Dalton failed to mitigate all of his
damages,

Herold must show that the court's decision lacked a

reasonable basis. This he failed to do. Moreover, even if Dalton
had made no effort at rehabilitation after sustaining his severe
injuries (and he did make an effort), that, in and of itself, does
not demonstrate that the trial court erred in concluding that the
verdict for Dalton was inadequate.

Jehl v. Southern Pacific Co.,

427 P.2d 988, 991 (Cal. 1967).
E.

Conclusion
The lower court followed correct procedures and applied

correct standards in awarding the additur.

The decision was well

within the court's discretion because the evidence of special
damages and the severe injuries incurred by Dalton each justify the
lower court's decision. The doctrine of mitigation of damages does
not warrant or require a reversal of the lower court's decision.
For these reasons, the decision of the lower court should be
affirmed.

22

POINT III
THE COSTS AWARDED WERE
AUTHORIZED AND APPROPRIATE.
A.

Factual and Procedural Background
Prior

to trial, Herold

made

a Rule

judgment in the amount of $15,000.00 (R. 62-64).

68(b) offer of
The offer was not

accepted. Moreover, the final judgment obtained against Herold was
more than one and a half times the offer of judgment.
judgment totalled $26,246.99.

The final

Because the judgment obtained by

Dalton was more favorable than the Herold offer, the trial court,
as a matter of course, awarded the following costs:
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Filing fee
$
Travel expenses Re:
depositions of
Herold & Dalton
Court reporter fees (depo.)
Brian Herold
Art Dalton
Newell Knight
Dr. Warren Stadler
Dr. Vaughn Mikesell
Dr. James Morgan
Dr. Richard Hodnett
Process server's fees, witness
fees, and mileage
Newell Knight (depo.)
Dr. Warren Stadler (depo.)
Dr. Warren Stadler (service)
Dr. Vaughn Mikesell (service)
Dr. James Morgan (service)
Dr. Richard Hodnett (service)
Officer Mike Roberts (service)

120.00
573.00
258.75
169.95
188.90
194.15
62.50
34.50
13.25
125.00
400.00
43.00
37.00
35.00
45.00
3Q.QQ

$ 2,330.00

TOTAL:
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B. fregal Analysis
1.

The Lower Court Correctly Awarded Dalton His Costs
Because the Final Judgment was More Favorable Than the
Offer of Judgment Submitted by Herold.
Rule 68(b) provides:
If the judgment finally obtained by the
offeree [Dalton] is not more favorable than
the offer, the offeree [Dalton] must pay the
costs incurred after the making of the offer.
However,

the

$26,000 plus

final

judgment

awarded to

Dalton was more favorable to Dalton than the $15,000.00 offered by
Herold.

Thus, the offer is irrelevant to the issue of whether the

lower court was correct when it awarded Dalton his costs.

Since

the final judgment was more favorable than Herold's offer, the
lower court "as a matter of course" awarded costs to Dalton, the
prevailing party pursuant to U.R.C.P. 54(d)(1).

Rule 54(d) leaves

the question of costs within the discretion of the trial court.
Hull v. Goodman. 4 Utah 2d 163, 290 P.2d 245 (1955).

Herold has

not shown any abuse of discretion committed by the trial court.
Thus, the cost award should not be modified.
2.

The Lower Court Correctly Awarded Costs For Deposition
Costs (Reporter's Fees and Witness Fees). Process Server
Fees, and Travel Expenses.
Qjgtold objects to the lower court awarding $188.90 for

court reporter's fees incurred in the taking of the deposition of
Newell Knight.

Newell Knight was the accident

expert retained by Herold.

reconstruction

Deposition costs, including court
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reporter's fees, are allowed as necessary and reasonable costs
where the development of the case is of such a complex nature that
discovery cannot be accompanied through less expensive discovery
methods.

Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad, 683

P.2d 1042, 1051 (Utah 1984).
that

the

lower

court

In this case, Herold has not shown

abused

its

discretion

in

awarding

the

reporter's costs in obtaining Knight's opinions, the basis for his
opinions, and the expert's methodology10.
The Court also correctly awarded $525.00 as costs for the
witness fees associated with the taking of the depositions of
Knight

and

struct ionist.
not paid

Stadler.

Knight

Herold's

accident

Stadler was Herold's medical expert.

the two witness

deposition.

was

fees, he could

recon-

If Dalton had

not have taken the

That these fees are necessarily incurred deposition

costs is established by U.R.C.P. 26(b) (4) (C) , which required Dalton
to pay Knight and Stadler a reasonable fee for their time.

Hence,

the witness fees paid to Stadler and Herold come under the same
analysis as set forth in Highland, supra.

10

Herold is in no position to argue that the deposition was
unnecessary. Herold never disclosed what Mr. Knight's testimony
would be. Nor did he disclose that Knight did not have an opinion
and could not render one. Herold knew this information prior to
the taking of Knight's deposition. The added costs could have been
avoided had Herold informed Dalton that Knight lacked an opinion
and would not be testifying.
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The lower court also allowed some minimal service fees
incurred in subpoenaing Dr. Stadler, Dr. Mikesell, Dr. Hodnett,
Officer Mike Roberts, and all who testified at the trial. Awarded
fees were for Dr. Stadler ($43.00), Dr. Mikesell ($37.00), Dr.
Hodnett ($45.00), Dr. Morgan ($35.00), and Roberts ($30.00). Utah
Code Ann. §21-2-4(1) and (4) provide for a service fee of $6.00
plus $1.00 per mile going from the courthouse.

To challenge the

award, Herold must show that the statutory rates were exceeded.
However, Herold has pointed to nothing in the record which shows
that the process service fees were incorrectly calculated.

In

short, he has failed to show that the lower court abused its
discretion in awarding these small fees.
Finally, the Court awarded the trial expenses of Dalton's
counsel to depose Herold in Oregon ($317.00) and Dalton in Colorado
($256.00). Ordinarily, counsel's travel expenses are not taxed as
costs. However, the lower court awarded these travel costs because
Heroldfs counsel would not agree to a reasonable discovery plan
wherein

the parties would make their

clients available for

depositions in Utah. Simply put, Herold chose to run up the costs
(R. 405-408).

Had Dalton moved for the imposition of a discovery

plan pursuant to F.R.C.P. 26, and Herold refused to cooperate in
the plan, the Court could have imposed reasonable expenses under
Rule 37(e).

However, there is no reason analytically why Herold

should be treated differently just because the Court had not
26

ordered a discovery plan.

Rule 37(e) sanctions are imposed to

assure that the parties reasonably cooperate in discovery. In this
case, a reasonable discovery plan was proposed by Dalton and
rejected by Herold.

On that basis, the Court correctly exercised

its discretion to award the travel expenses.

VIII.
CONCLUSION
The standard
discretion.

of review of an additur is abuse of

The lower court did not abuse its discretion because

the lower court followed correct procedures and applied correct
standards when it granted the small additur.
decision does not lack a reasonable basis.

The lower court's

Both the evidence of

special damages and Dalton's severe injuries justify the lower
court's additur.

The costs awarded by the lower court are

authorized and appropriate.

For each of these reasons, the

Judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of December, 1994.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for/PlaintiffyAppellant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARVIN A. DALTON, JR.,

I SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiff,
vs.
i Civil No. 920903329PI
BRIAN G. HEROLD,
Judge Leslie A. Lewis
Defendant.
We, the jury in the above-entitled action, answer the
questions submitted to us as follows:
1.

At the time and place of the incident in question

and under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, was the
^

defendant, Brian Herold negligent?

YES X
2.

Was such negligence a proximate cause of plaintiff's

injury?
YES
3.

NO

x

NO

At the time and place of the incident in question

and under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, was the
plaintiff, Art Dalton, negligent?

YES

X

NO

U W w v* l*

4.

Was such negligence a proximate cause of plaintiff's

injury?
X

YES
5.
incident

at

NO

Considering all the negligence which caused the
100%, which

percentage

of

that

negligence

is

attributable:
§0

A.

To defendant, Brian Herold:

%

B.

To plaintiff, Art Dalton:

6.

What sum would fairly compensate plaintiff for the

Z&

%

damages, if any, which he sustained as a result of the incident?
(a)

Special Damages

(b)

General Damages

$ 6000 - ^

TOTAL

$

DATED and singed this

/?

$006^

day of May, 1993 at Salt

Lake City, Utah.

FOREPERSON

4839-021

00293

Tab 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARVIN A. DALTON, JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

: MEMORANDUM DECISION
: CASE NO. 920903329
:

BRIAN G. HEROLD,
Defendant.

:
:

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Plaintiff's
Motion for Additur or New Trial. A hearing was held in this Court
on August 10, 1993, and argument was heard on the plaintiff's
motion. The court denied the plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and
took the Motion for Additur under advisement. The Court having now
carefully reviewed the relevant law, the memoranda submitted by
counsel, and having considered counsels' arguments, rules as stated
herein.

The Court finds that the amount of the jury's verdict is

inconsistent with the evidence adduced at trial, and grants the
Motion for Additur in the amount of $19,910.24 as to special
damages.

The jury's award of $5,000.00 for general damages is to

remain at that amount.
The Court in assessing the verdict has considered the same in
the light most favorable to the jury's findings. Assessment, under

FILE COPY
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this standard, leads the Court to conclude that the jury's award is
clearly inadequate in light of the evidence presented at trial.
The law is clear that although a trial judge may assess the
evidence

differently

than

a jury, mere disagreement

sufficient reason to order a new trial or an additur.

is not a

The power of

a trial judge to order a new trial or grant an additur is reserved
for those rare cases when a jury verdict is manifestly contrary to
the weight of the evidence.

Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P. 2d 530 (Utah

1984), and Bodon v. Suhrmann, 327 P.2d 826 (Utah 1958).

Bodon v.

Suhrmann, makes it clear that if an award shows that the jury
misapplied

or

failed

to

take

into

account

proven

facts,

or

misunderstood or disregarded the law, or made findings clearly
against the evidence, and the verdict is outside the limits of any
reasonable appraisal of damages as shown by the evidence, it should
not be permitted to stand.
remains the law in Utah.

Although Bodon is a 1958 case, it
Bodon has been cited and reaffirmed in

Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P.2d

685

(Utah 1981), and in Mever v.

Bartholomew. 690 P.2d 558 (Utah 1984).
The Bodon case is important to review in relation to the
instant case.

In Bodon, the contention was that the verdict was

outside the limits of what appeared justifiable under the evidence.
The Court ruled, "In such instances the remedy is to order a

DALTON V. HEROLD
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modification of the verdict to bring it within the evidence."

Id

at 828.
This Court finds the amount of $20,007.00 for future medical
expenses to have been undisputed

and uncontroverted

at trial.

During the trial Dr. Richard Hodnett and Dr. Leo Vaughn Mikesell,
expert witnesses called by the plaintiff, testified that the amount
of future medical

expenses, if surgery

occurred (and they both

perceived surgery as necessary), would be, at least, $20,007.00.
Although the defendant called Dr. Warren Stadler as a witness,
evidence of the cost of the plaintiff's special damages was not
disputed.
A finding of negligence was made and a review of the Special
Verdict form establishes that the jury concluded that the plaintiff
had been damaged.

The award for special damages must bear a

reasonable relationship to the evidence. This Court finds that the
award of $3,000.00 does not bear this reasonable relationship to
the evidence adduced at trial.

The plaintiff presented evidence

that his past medical bills were $2,903.24 (see Exhibit 3 ) ; and an
award of $3,000.00, while close to this amount, is greater than the
actual past medical expenses, and not consistent with any actual
special damages.

An additur is therefore granted.

The total

special damages testified to were $22,910.24. The jury's award of

DALTON V. HEROLD
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$3,000.00, is $19,910.24 below this. Additur is therefore granted
in the amount of $19,910.24.

This amount, when added to the

special damage verdict of $3,000.00, equals $22,910.24, which is
consistent with the testimony concerning specials.
The Court now turns its attention to the general damage award.
It is well-settled that general damages must bear a reasonable
relationship to special damages and to the evidence.

General

damages are designed to compensate an injured plaintiff for pain
and suffering and for damages that the plaintiff has incurred over
and above those ouantifiable damages such as lost wages and medical
expenses. Mclntire v. Gray, 593 P.2d 1273 (Or. App. 1979).
clear

that

special

damages

are

assessment than general damages.

more

capable

of

It is

definitive

General damages are by their

nature more subjective and difficult to pin down. This Court must
view the general damage award in relation to the original special
damage award and determine whether a reasonable relationship exists
between the two.

Where the original award for specials was

$3,000.00 and the general award was $5,000.00; one cannot conclude
that a reasonable relationship between the two does not exist. The
question of whether the award bears a reasonable relationship to
the evidence, must

be assessed, with the case

concerning general damages.

law in mind

Case law concerning general damages

indicates that these awards are rarely susceptible of additur.
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Cruz v, Montova, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983), the Court ruled

that juries are generally allowed wide discretion in the assessment
of damages, and that where personal injuries involve a loss of
employment, personal inconvenience, and pain and suffering, there
is no set formula to compute the amount of general damages.
726.

Id. at

In the case of Sheraden v. Black, 752 P.2d 791, (N.M. App.

1988) , the Court ruled that "there is no standard fixed by law for
measuring the value of pain and suffering; rather the amount to be
awarded is left to the fact finder's judgment.11

And, in another

case, Cartwriaht v. Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc., 593 P.2d 104
(Okl. App.

1988)

it was held

that compensation

for pain and

suffering rests in the sound discretion of the jury, since there is
no market where pain and suffering are bought and sold, nor any
standard by which compensation

can be definitely ascertained, or

the amount actually suffered determined.
This analysis leads this Court to conclude that generals and
specials are sufficiently distinct from each other
may be subject to additur without modification of
two are not synonymous nor are they inseparable.

that specials
generals.

The

To illustrate

this concept, the Court notes that a jury is at liberty, in some
circumstances, to award one without the other,

"When the issue of

general damages is contested, the jury may conclude that the
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plaintiff did not actually suffer any general damages but did
reasonably incur special damages for medical expenses or loss of
wages •

This is the case if the plaintiff's complaints are

subjective and his credibility is questioned." Eisele v. Rood. 551
P.2d 441 (Or. 1976).
While this Court was not privy to the jury's deliberations or
exact considerations in arriving at the general damage award, this
Court can only conclude that the jury did not feel that the
plaintiff's entitlement to general damages, i.e., his pain and
suffering, warranted a large amount.

This Court appreciates the

province of the jury and will not substitute its judgment for that
of the jury in arriving at a general damage award.
In making this ruling, this Court elects to exercise its
supervisory power to ensure justice consistent with the jury's
verdict.
The defendant may accept this ruling, or request a new trial.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the

nnHS
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, thisofc/'day of
September, 1993:

George T. Waddoups
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Mark Dalton Dunn
Kevin D. Swenson
DUNN & DUNN
Attorney for Defendant
460 Midtown Plaza
23 0 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

faHh/nrlTHtthe/UTY)

Tab 3

FfLEO0KTIt?«><sifttf?
Judicial Oistnct

AH 2 4 B94
GEORGE T. WADDOUPS #3965
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915

By
Deputy Clerk

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARVIN A. DALTON, JR.,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 920903329PI
BRIAN G. HEROLD,
Judge Leslie A. Lewis
Defendant.
This matter was tried to the jury on May 17th, 18th, and
19th, 1993, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis presiding.

George T.

Waddoups and Karen Thomas represented the plaintiff. Mark Dunn and
Kevin Swenson represented the defendant.
The Court directed a verdict against the defendant and
answered question one on the verdict form. The jury found that the
defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries. The jury also found the plaintiff was negligent and the
plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries.

The jury answered question five by assessing 80% of the

W5£;

negligence to the defendant Brian Herold and 20% of the negligence
to the plaintiff, Art Dalton.
The jury awarded special damages in the amount of $3,000.
The jury also awarded general damages in the amount of $5,000, for
total

damages

in

the

amount

of

$8,000.

The

verdict

appropriately dated and signed by the jury foreperson.

was

The Court

having inquired of the jury as to its verdict directs the judgment
to be entered in accordance with the verdict and its Memorandum
Decision entered September 22, 1993, and incorporated herein by
reference, which

grants plaintiff's

additur

in the

additional

amount for specials of $19,910.24:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment
be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,
Brian Herold, as follows:
1.

The

plaintiff

defendant

is

awarded

judgment

for special damages

against

in the

the

amount

of

$18,328.19 ($3,000 + $19,910.24 X 8 0 % ) .
2.

The

plaintiff

is

awarded

judgment

against

the

defendant for pre-judgment interest of past special
damages in the amount of $794.40 pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-27-44.

This sum represents interest

at 10% per annum on $2,400 from October 15, 1990
through September, 1993.

2

00456

3.

The

plaintiff

defendant

is

awarded

judgment

for general damages

against

the

in the amount of

$4,000 ($5,000 x 80%).
4.

The plaintiff

is awarded

post-judgment

interest

against the defendant pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§15-1-4 consistent with the judgment accruing at
the rate of 5.72% per annum.
5.

The plaintiff

is awarded

his costs against

the

defendant in the amount of $3,124.40.
6.

The

total

[$18,328.19

judgment
(special

awarded
damages)

is
+

$26,246.99

$794.40

(pre-

judgment interest) + $4,000.00 (general damages) +
$3,124.40 (costs and fees)].
DATED this

day of „ ^ , ^ 1 -

Leslie A. Lewis
Third District Cou
Approved as to form:

Mark D. Dunn
Attorney for Defendant

4839.jud
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Tab 4

MEDICAL BILLS AND TREATMENT
SUMMARY FOR

MARVIN DALTON
PROVIDER
HOLY CROSS
HOSPITAL
VALLEY
RADIOLOGISTS

DATE

DESCRIPTION

TOTAL

10/15/90

Examination; x-rays;
CT scans, stitches;

$1,232.77

X-rays; CT scans

$

328.47

Extended consultation,
examination & x-rays

$

115.00

Consultation and
examination

$

192.00

10/15/90

DR. RICHARD HODNETT 12/05/90
DR. WILLIAM BENTLEY 05/16/91
DR. KARL GROSS

05/20/91

EMG study

$

540.00

DR. MARC SCHWARTZ

06/25/91

Consultation,
examination and x-rays

$

95.00

TMJ consultation and
report

$

265.00

TMJ exam and x-ray

$

135.00

DR. MICHAEL COSBY
DR. L. VAUN
MIKESELL

05/12/93

02/23/93

MEDICAL EXPENSES:

«39^H6

$2,903.24

